Audit and ownership
An owner for every credential, evidence an auditor can verify, and rules about where your data may live.
Self-hosted PKI and data residency
A certificate inventory is a map of your infrastructure, and the keys behind it are your infrastructure's identity. Where that data lives is a security decision and, in many places, a legal one. What leaves your network when certificate management is someone else's service, and what self-hosting has to guarantee to be worth it.
Proving a renewal happened
An auditor does not want to hear that renewals are automated. They want the record: who asked, who approved, what was issued, where it went, when it was verified, and proof the record has not been edited. What that evidence looks like when it is the system's own state.
AI agents need badges, not API keys
Agents appear fast, act with real privileges, and call other systems that call other systems. A long-lived API key in a config file is the wrong credential for that. What an agent's identity should look like, and how a delegation chain keeps every hop narrower than the last.
SSH keys are the certificates you forgot
Every server has a file of public keys that grant standing access, added by people who have since left. SSH certificates replace the file with one authority and a short-lived note per login. How they work, what OpenSSH already supports, and what changes.
What an MSP does with 300 customers' certificates
For a managed service provider the 47-day schedule is not a chore, it is a capacity problem: a book of business becomes tens of thousands of renewals a week. What one control plane for many customers has to guarantee, and the isolation you can prove rather than promise.
The wildcard six teams share
One certificate, six owners, zero accountability, and from 2029 twelve simultaneous renewals a year across every host that holds a copy. What a wildcard really is, when it is still the right tool, and how to stop it being the outage nobody can explain.
Your certificate inventory is wrong. Find out by Friday.
Three sources of truth that never agree: the public transparency logs, a scan of your own network, and the hosts themselves. A one-week method for finding the certificates nobody wrote down, and giving each one an owner.