Key protection
Where private keys live, who can use them, and how to automate signing without letting the automation hold the keys.
Self-hosted PKI and data residency
A certificate inventory is a map of your infrastructure, and the keys behind it are your infrastructure's identity. Where that data lives is a security decision and, in many places, a legal one. What leaves your network when certificate management is someone else's service, and what self-hosting has to guarantee to be worth it.
A private CA in an afternoon
The certificates the public web cannot issue, for internal names, private addresses, client authentication and offline networks, need an authority you run. The tree, the ceremony, the constraints, and the one step that takes a quarter rather than an afternoon.
AI agents need badges, not API keys
Agents appear fast, act with real privileges, and call other systems that call other systems. A long-lived API key in a config file is the wrong credential for that. What an agent's identity should look like, and how a delegation chain keeps every hop narrower than the last.
The wildcard six teams share
One certificate, six owners, zero accountability, and from 2029 twelve simultaneous renewals a year across every host that holds a copy. What a wildcard really is, when it is still the right tool, and how to stop it being the outage nobody can explain.
Why the signer is a separate process
Automation has to sign certificates all day. It should never hold the keys. How trstctl draws that line, what the line guarantees, and what it does not, with links to the code.
PKI in plain words
Certificates, private keys, authorities, chains, domain-control validation, ACME, expiry, revocation and transparency logs, explained for someone who owns more certificates than they can name.