A ctlplne studio product
22 October 2026 · 3 min read

SSH keys are the certificates you forgot

TLS certificates get a deadline and a ballot. SSH keys get nothing, which is why plenty of servers still trust a public key added in 2019 by a contractor whose laptop is in a drawer. The fix has been in OpenSSH for over a decade.

Machine identityPrivate PKIAudit and ownership

The file

Most SSH access works by copying a user's public key into a server's authorized_keys file. It scales badly and ages dangerously: keys pile up, nobody remembers whose they are, and removing access means finding every copy on every host.1 There is no expiry by default, no owner, and no record of who added what. It is the credential family with the least attention and the most standing privilege.

Before: each user's key copied to every host. After: hosts trust one SSH authority, users present short-lived certificates. before: keys everywhere alice.pubbob.pubex-contractor.pub host 1host 2host N every key on every host, forever after: one authority SSH CA key in the signer host 1host 2host N hosts trust the CA once alice, until 17:00 signed certificate users present a short-lived certificate per session
Trust moves from N files to one key, and access moves from forever to an expiry.

The certificate

OpenSSH has supported certificates since 2010. An SSH authority signs a user's public key together with a list of principals (the accounts it may log in as), a validity window, and optional restrictions such as a forced command or a source address.2 A server configured to trust the authority's key accepts any valid certificate it signed, with no per-user file to maintain. The same mechanism works in the other direction: host certificates let clients verify a server without the trust-on-first-use prompt and the stale known-hosts entries that follow.2

The properties fall out of the shape. Expiry is automatic, because the certificate carries it. Removing a person is not a hunt across hosts, because nothing was copied to the hosts. And every login credential has a record: who was issued what, for which principals, until when.

What changes in practice

  1. Hosts trust the authority, once. One line in the server configuration replaces every authorized_keys entry. Existing files can be left in place during the transition, then removed, which is also the moment you learn who was still relying on them.
  2. Users get certificates, not keys. A certificate valid for the working day, or for an hour, issued after the person proves who they are. The private key can still be generated on the laptop; what the servers trust is the signature, not the key.
  3. Machines get certificates too. A CI job or a cloud instance should log in with a certificate issued only after it proves what it is, valid for minutes. That closes the class of standing machine keys that outlive the machine.
  4. The authority's key becomes the crown jewel. Everything above concentrates trust in one signing key, which is the point, and which means that key belongs behind the same hard boundary as a CA key.

trstctl's SSH authority signs both host and user certificates with principals, validity windows and critical options, through the isolated signer, with issuance profiles that cap the lifetime and every issuance recorded as an immutable event. An attestation-gated issuer goes further: a user certificate is issued only against a verified attestation, the requesting account must differ from the attested identity, source-address and forced-command restrictions are supported, the default lifetime is fifteen minutes, and a failed attestation fails closed.3 An agent configures hosts to trust the authority safely, and discovery finds the standing keys you are replacing.3,4

Sources

  1. trstctl documentation, SSH, "What it is" and "Why it exists".
  2. OpenSSH, ssh-keygen(1), Certificates: signing user and host certificates with principals, validity intervals and critical options; sshd_config(5), TrustedUserCAKeys.
  3. trstctl documentation, SSH: the SSH certificate authority (F43), deployment and trust configuration (F44), attestation-gated short-lived user certificates (F45).
  4. trstctl documentation, Discovery and inventory, "SSH credential discovery".