A ctlplne studio product
22 October 2026 · 3 min read

Client certificates after the EKU split

For years a public TLS certificate could be used in both directions: to prove a server to a browser, and to prove a client to a server. That convenience is being removed on purpose, with dates. Mutual TLS is not going away. Its certificates are moving home.

PKI fundamentalsMachine identityPrivate PKI

What is being split

A certificate carries a list of purposes it may be used for. Most public server certificates carried two: server authentication and client authentication. Chrome's root program policy now states that its root store "is solely relied upon for TLS server authentication in Chrome; it is not used for any other PKI use case (e.g., TLS client authentication, secure email, code-signing, etc.)".1 The policy attaches dates: subordinate CA certificates disclosed on or after 15 June 2026 must assert only the server-authentication purpose, and subscriber certificates issued on or after 15 March 2027 must do the same.1

Let's Encrypt moved ahead of those dates. Its default profile dropped the client-authentication purpose on 11 February 2026, and the temporary profile that kept it ended on 8 July 2026; no certificate it issues now can authenticate a client.2

Two hierarchies after the split: the public web PKI for server authentication only, and a private PKI for client authentication public Web PKI roots in browser trust stores serverAuth only browsers verify your serversissued by public authorities47 days by 2029 clientAuth removed: 2026 to 2027 your private PKI roots you distribute yourself clientAuth (and internal serverAuth) your servers verify your clientsworkloads, devices, people, agentsminutes to days you control both ends
The public hierarchy proves servers to strangers. Proving clients to your own servers was always your job; now the certificates have to come from you too.

Why it is the right call

Client authentication was never a good fit for public authorities. A public certificate proves control of a name to anyone; a client certificate has to prove identity to one specific relying party, which is you, and you can do that better with an authority you run, on your own terms, with lifetimes and revocation you control. Splitting the hierarchies also shrinks what a public CA compromise can reach: a mis-issued public certificate can no longer walk into an internal system that trusted the public roots for clients.

Where client certificates come from now

  1. A private issuing CA dedicated to clients. Constrained to the client-authentication purpose, with its key behind the signer boundary, and with short lifetimes because renewal is automated.3
  2. Workload identity for services. A service proves what and where it is, then receives a short-lived certificate that carries a SPIFFE ID; that certificate is a client certificate for mutual TLS between services.4
  3. Attested issuance for machines and people. CI jobs, cloud instances and operators receive certificates only after an attestation or an approval, valid for minutes to a day.4,5
  4. Device enrollment protocols for the things that cannot run an agent. Network gear, printers and appliances enroll through the protocols they already speak.6
  5. Trust distribution that names the right root. Servers that verify clients should trust your client CA and nothing else, which is a smaller, safer trust store than "the public roots plus ours".

What to do before March 2027

Find every place a public certificate is presented as a client certificate: partner integrations, mutual-TLS APIs, VPNs, service meshes bootstrapped from public roots. Each one needs a private certificate and a relying party that trusts your CA. The work is the trust distribution, and the deadline is the one Chrome set, whether or not your integrations know it.

trstctl issues client certificates from its own hierarchy, attested workload identities with SPIFFE IDs, attestation-gated credentials for machines and operators, and supports the enrollment protocols devices speak, with every issuance recorded in the tamper-evident audit trail.3,4,6

Sources

  1. Google, Chrome Root Program Policy, version 1.8, section 1.3.2: dedicated TLS server authentication hierarchies, with the 15 June 2026 and 15 March 2027 dates.
  2. Let's Encrypt, Ending TLS Client Authentication Certificate Support in 2026, updated 16 March 2026.
  3. trstctl documentation, Issuance and CAs, "Running your own CA hierarchy"; Signing service design.
  4. trstctl documentation, Workload identity; SPIFFE, SPIFFE Overview.
  5. trstctl documentation, SSH: attestation-gated short-lived certificates.
  6. trstctl documentation, Enrollment protocols.