Revocation is dead. Long live short lifetimes.
Revocation was the promise that a stolen key could be switched off. On the public web that promise was mostly theater, and in the last two years the people who run the web said so out loud. Short lifetimes are what replaced it.
The promise
A certificate authority can publish that a certificate should no longer be trusted, in two ways: a signed revocation list, and an online responder that answers for one certificate at a time.1,2 The idea is that a browser checks before trusting. The practice was that the check was slow, leaked which sites you visit to the authority, and failed open when the responder was unreachable, because failing closed would have taken down the web every time an authority had a bad day.
What actually happened
- The rules changed first. In July 2023 the CA/Browser Forum passed a ballot making OCSP optional and revocation lists mandatory, in force from 15 March 2024.3
- Chrome stopped asking long ago. Chrome does not generally perform online OCSP or CRL checks. It ships a compact list of emergency revocations, built by crawling the lists authorities disclose, as its primary way to block a certificate quickly.4
- Firefox built a better list. Desktop Firefox downloads a compact encoding of every revoked certificate visible in the transparency logs, refreshes it every twelve hours, and queries it locally; since Firefox 142 in August 2025, OCSP is disabled for domain-validated certificates.5
- The biggest authority switched it off. Let's Encrypt dropped OCSP URLs from its certificates on 7 May 2025 and turned its responders off on 6 August 2025, citing privacy and the cost of running the service.6
- Then it shortened the certificate instead. Announcing six-day certificates, Let's Encrypt said the quiet part: "certificate revocation doesn't work very well", and a short lifetime "greatly reduce[s] the potential compromise window".7
What replaces it
Expiry. A certificate that lives 47 days cannot be misused for long after its key leaks, whether or not anyone checks a list. Browser-side lists still catch the emergencies, and authorities still publish revocation lists because the rules require them, but the design intent is now clear: revocation is a backstop, and the lifetime is the control.8
What it means for a private authority
Inside your own walls the calculus is different, because you control the clients. A private authority should still publish revocation lists and answer status queries, because internal clients can be configured to check them and fail closed. But the lesson from the public web applies: keep internal lifetimes short enough that revocation is rarely the thing you depend on, and automate renewal so that short is affordable.
trstctl's own authority publishes revocation lists and online status for the certificates it issues, and can revoke through ACME authorities, Vault PKI and EJBCA; for the rest it says plainly where to revoke instead.9
The issuance page covers revocation for trstctl's own CA, and the limitations page which external authorities can be revoked through.
Sources
- IETF, RFC 5280: certificate revocation lists.
- IETF, RFC 6960: Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP).
- CA/Browser Forum, Ballot SC-063v4: Make OCSP Optional, Require CRLs, and Incentivize Automation, in effect 15 March 2024.
- The Chromium Projects, CRLSets: "Online (i.e. OCSP and CRL) checks are not generally performed by Chrome."
- Mozilla, CRLite: Fast, private, and comprehensive certificate revocation checking in Firefox, August 2025.
- Let's Encrypt, Ending OCSP Support in 2025.
- Let's Encrypt, Announcing Six Day and IP Address Certificate Options in 2025.
- CA/Browser Forum, Ballot SC-081v3.
- trstctl documentation, Issuance and CAs, "Revocation: OCSP and CRLs"; Limitations, revocation through external issuers.